The aim of this paper is to examine and provide new evidence on changes in the costs and other determinants of economic rationality of international sharing of armaments projects. Based on current transaction costs theory, it defi nes individual and collective transaction costs of a weapon systems club. Using results of questionnaire survey, gathering expectations of international expert armaments community, there are analysed relations anticipated among those determinants, which are decisive for the amount of project costs. Results of these analyses indicate general anticipation of decreased total project costs in case of international sharing of armaments projects, along with increased project transparency, which can be viewed as one of the generators of decreased total costs. Transaction costs have indicated an unchanged level or a moderate decrease. Their individual component is to decrease. On the other hand, collective transaction costs are to grow, however, up to the extent of the decrease of individual transaction costs.
Introduction
Recent developments in military spending of most Western and Central European countries have strengthened the antagonism between the amount of public resources allocated to defense and the generally unchanging defense ambitions and commitments. Substantial cuts in military spending by Western and Central European countries resulted in an annual overall decrease of 1.9% in the region in 2011. These cuts are in sharp contrast with the steadily growing worldwide military spending in many other regions, e.g. in Eastern Europe by 20.2%, in Africa by 8.6% or Middle East by 4.6%, worldwide by 0.3% (SIPRI, 2011) . In addition, due to the lasting debt crisis, prevailing expectations show that defense sectors in Western and Central European countries will continue to develop under conditions of austerity in the years to come.
These trends necessitate approaches enhancing the effi ciency of resources allocated to defense, including the rationale of sharing defense burden as outlined e.g. in the EU Concept of "Pooling and Sharing" (European Commission, 2003) or in the NATO "Smart Defence" approach (NATO Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities, 1. Analyze correlation structure among variables characterizing transaction costs resulting from international armaments cooperation, compare and interpret individual levels of expectations.
2. Identify empirical determinants of transaction costs and compare them with theoretical factors described in literature.
3. Analyze trends of expected project total costs development in relation to overall transaction costs and other variables.
4. Evaluate consistency and structure of expectations of subject matter experts according to their classifi cation in responders segments and verify validity of the survey results.
To fulfi ll the above listed aims, instruments of descriptive statistics, non-parametric statistics and multivariate statistical methods have been applied. All the calculations have been performed using the STATISTICA 8 software.
Transaction Costs Theory
Behaviour of stakeholders in armaments contracts cannot be satisfactorily explained by applying microeconomic assumptions of a rationally behaving consumer under conditions of perfect information. To explain the existence of transaction costs in armaments contracts, the theory of the so-called new institutional economics can be applied, based on the assumption of bounded rationality and opportunism. In the PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2, 2014  219 case of armaments contracts the contracting authorities (governments) do not have access to all relevant information. Gathering this information represents a substantial burden resulting in the growth of transaction costs. Similarly, the second assumption of opportunism consists in the notion of an individual whose objective is maximizing his personal benefi ts, i.e. his individual interests, and anticipates the subsistence of transaction costs. Nevertheless, a real economic environment becomes a form conscious of breaking conditions of competition or the presence of corrupt practices. Detailed classifi cation of preconditions of the transaction costs theory (Gareth and Hill, 1988) identifi es six main factors infl uencing implementation of a given transaction (bounded rationality, opportunism, uncertainty and complexity, small numbers, information impactedness and asset specifi city).
Transaction costs, representing an integral part of costs of any armaments contract, have been analyzed already by Coase (1937) and Vahabi (2011) , who have characterized the justifi cation of the existence of fi rms as economic entities. The notion of a fi rm based on the assumption of overall cost minimization, which includes both production and transaction costs, has been further elaborated in the works of North and Wallis (1986) , Williamson (1985) , (1986), Matthews (1986) or Pavel (2004) .
Using the example of the USA, the empirical study by North and Wallis (1986) analyses the development of transaction costs between the years 1870 and 1970 in relation to GDP. Matthews (1986) has classifi ed ex ante and ex post transaction costs. A detailed analysis of transaction costs has been further elaborated by Williamson (1985) . According to Furubotn and Richter (1998) , transaction costs can be classifi ed as market transaction costs, management transaction costs and political transaction costs.
Another approach classifi es transaction costs as information costs, negotiation costs and contract monitoring costs (Hobbs, 1997) . Information and negotiation costs are defi ned as ex ante transaction costs, monitoring costs belong to ex post transaction costs (Hobbs, 1997; similarly Matthews, 1986) . Estimations of the amounts of such defi ned transaction costs have been published in several studies (Walsh and Davis, 1993; Audit Commission, 1995) . In the case of ex ante transaction costs authors Walsh, Davis (1993) estimate their amount at the level of less than 2% of the transaction value and in case of ex post transaction costs these estimates state the level of nearly 4% of given transaction value (Audit Commission, 1995) . Similar classifi cation can be found in other publications as well (Dyer, 1997) , where ex ante transaction costs include searching for potential commercial partners, costs of negotiations with partner(s), preparation of contract terms and conditions and monitoring costs. Ex post transaction costs then include the costs of enforcing a contract and applying sanctions.
Similar classifi cation of transaction costs (Weber, 1997) considers transaction costs as one of the factors infl uencing defense cooperation among nations within a formal alliance or confederation. Weber examines two assumptions (bounded rationality and opportunism) and three characteristics of transactions in international defense cooperation (frequency of transactions, asset specifi city and uncertainty). Transaction costs theory applied to decision-making problems of international defense cooperation stresses the key role of the factor of potential threats as a determinant of establishment of defense alliances or confederations.
Analysis of Infl uence of Transaction Costs in International Armaments Cooperation Rationale
As mentioned above, transaction costs represent an important component of armaments projects costs and therefore, belong to the determinants potentially promoting or hindering governments´ will to internationally share their armaments projects. Only limited information on estimates or actual records of the amount of transaction costs in armaments contracts is available. What is their actual role in international armaments cooperation?
Armaments Contracts Transaction Cost Analysis Framework
The obvious lack of empirical data and case studies or their confi dentiality represent a signifi cant limit to an examination of links existing among individual determinants decisive for armaments international cooperation effi ciency. Therefore the interviews or questionnaire surveys represent the only method to collect data on at least expectations of members of subject matter experts (Hartley, 1995) . These experts consist of a heterogeneous population representing different interest groups (different nations, international organizations, industry, contracting authorities, and academia).
To assure validity of the responses collected the survey has focused on the broad international NATO/EU expert community representing all interest groups. To gather the data required, this paper has followed the generally accepted approach (Kerlinger, 1986) . This applies to the data evaluation and interpretation as well.
To examine the behaviour of selected variables of interest, especially individual project cost items (with special focus on transaction costs) a questionnaire survey has been carried out to collect the anticipations of altogether 126 Czech as well as international experts representing three main interest groups in NATO/EU member countriesi.e. three categories of responders, representing:
-Defense industry;
-Contracting authorities (MoD); -Academia.
The limited number of experts in the subject matter area along with their will to take an active part in the survey (25 %) has represented an important limitation. Nevertheless, the relatively low number of responders has been partially compensated by a substantial consistency of the replies gathered across individual categories of responders and across the domestic (Czech) and international (NATO/EU) community.
The questionnaire consisted of 10 questions related to total armaments project costs, transaction costs and side-effects of international sharing of armaments projects. Tables 1, 2 and 3 below show a detailed description of these questions. Responses to these questions have enabled the identifi cation of attitudes and expectations of individual responders regarding the variables in question. Answers to individual questions included in the questionnaire have been classifi ed in an ordinal scale consisting of fi ve levels of relationship (1 -strongly increasing, 2 -moderately increasing, 3 -neutral, 4 -moderately decreasing and 5 -strongly decreasing infl uence).
As indicated above, the survey included questions covering following areas: a) Analysis of overall armaments project/contract costs (variable: Total Project Costs -TOC); for details see the Table 1 below; 
MEASUREMENT (QUESTION CHARATERIZING EXPECTATIONS OF EXPERT COMMUNITY)
Total project costs (TOC) Do you think that overall costs of an armament project based on cooperation of several governments would rather increase or decrease compared to the variant when each government carries out this contract without cooperation with other nations?
Source: Own. b) Analysis of side effects of international cooperation (sharing) in armaments projects (variable: Project Transparency -PTR); for details see the Table 2 below; Table 3 above. 

COLLECTIVE TRANSACTION COSTS (CTC)
Information Costs
Costs of searching for partner(s) (PSC) Do you expect that costs of searching out partner(s), who plan to purchase identical weapon systems, would rather increase or decrease overall armament project costs, which every government would have to spend?
Negotiation Costs
Costs of negotiating joint project terms and conditions with partner(s) (PNC) Do you expect that costs of negotiating joint project terms and conditions with partner(s), who plan to purchase identical weapon systems, would rather increase or decrease overall armament project costs, which every government would have to spend?
Monitoring Cost
Costs of enforcing compliance by partner(s) Transaction costs infl uence many activities both on the side of customer and contractor. In cases of internationally shared armaments projects, we can distinguish the so-called individual transaction costs (ITC) and collective transaction costs (CTC). ITC are traditional transaction costs, which occur even if a given contract is implemented by a given government without cooperating with other governments. Further classifi cation of ITC has been described previously in this paper. CTC relate to searching for partners demanding a similar commodity, negotiating terms and conditions of mutual cooperation among partners forming a "weapon system club", and monitoring fulfi lment of agreement among partners. Overall transaction costs (TRC) of an internationally shared project then represent the sum of ITC and CTC. If a given armaments contract is being carried out by a single government, TRC are represented by ITC. Based on Hobbs (1997) and Matthews (1986) , both of these categories of transaction costs have been classifi ed as information, monitoring and enforcement transaction costs. So defi ned transaction costs have been further analysed in relation to overall armaments project costs (TOC) and in relation to key side benefi ts of international cooperation in armaments projects, i.e. the level of project transparency (PTR).
Hypotheses and Methods of their Verifi cation
In order to identify relations and dependencies among determinants, values of which have been gathered in relation to international armaments cooperation, six hypotheses have been formulated. These hypotheses are focused on key cost considerations of international armaments cooperation:
H 1 : Is there any relationship between project transparency (PTR) and project total costs (TOC)?
H 2 : Is there any relationship between the expected project total costs (TOC) decrease and the anticipated development of a given project's overall transaction costs (TRC)?
H 3 : Is there any relationship between project individual transaction costs (ITC) and project total costs (TOC)?
H 4 : Do collective (weapon system club) transaction costs (CTC) behave similarly to project total costs (TOC)?
H 5 : Do the empirically identifi ed factors correspond with theoretical classifi cation of transaction costs as individual and collective ones? These hypotheses have been verifi ed using data resulting from statistical assessment of expectations declared by expert community. To identify decisive relations among determinants of international armaments cooperation, pairs of these determinants (variables) have been arranged. The measure of association of each of these examined pairs of variables has been characterized by Spearman's rank correlation coeffi cient SR.
To compare the levels of subject-matter experts´ expectations in replay to individual questions of the survey, Wilcoxon paired test has been applied, testing statistics Z calculated and p-value determined. Furthermore, Man Whitney test has been used to examine the test statistics MW and p-value were calculated for comparing of independent samples. Finally, Kruskal Wallis test (KW statistics, k degrees of freedom and p-value were calculated) has been applied for multiple comparisons of differences among the categories of experts. For detailed description of the above mentioned statistical methods, used to test hypothesis within this paper, see Agresti (2002) .
To identify individual and collective transaction costs defi ned above in this paper, factor analysis has been applied (see Johnson and Wichern, 2007; Odehnal and Michálek, 2009 ). The number of factors has been determined based on a cumulative percentage of explained variability where the authors mentioned above recommend explaining at least 70 % of the total variability. Furthermore, the rotated matrix of factor loadings (varimax rotation) has been used to identify the factors structure of transaction costs.
Statistical Evaluation of Anticipated Relationships -Empirical Results
To describe the results of the survey and verify relations among individual categories of costs, besides using their basic characteristics Spearman's rank correlation coeffi cients have been calculated in order to examine relation between the individual pairs of variables. The matrix of Spearman's rank correlation coeffi cients has been used as a basis for subsequent factor analysis. The Table 4 demonstrates (bold print indicates those correlation coeffi cients that are statistically signifi cant at the 5 % signifi cance level) that the variable of expected project total costs (TOC) positively and statistically signifi cantly correlates (at the 5 % signifi cance level) with the following variables:  225
In addition, the variable of costs of possible enforcement of contract fulfi lment by the contractor(s) (CEC) statistically signifi cantly correlates with contract negotiation cost (CNC) SR = 0.41 as well as monitoring cost (CMC), SR = 0.73. The variable of costs of negotiating joint project terms and conditions with partner(s) (PNC) signifi cantly at the 5 % signifi cance level and positively correlates with costs of searching for partner(s) (PSC), SR = 0.58 and signifi cantly negatively correlates with the variable of costs of possible enforcement of contract fulfi lment by the contractor(s) (CEC), SR = −0.41. Finally, the last signifi cant correlation has been identifi ed between the variable of project's overall transaction costs (TRC) and costs of searching for partner(s), (PSC), SR = 0.46.
When performing further analyses and interpretations of the results gathered within the survey, attention has been focused on verifying hypotheses H 1 -H 6 formulated in the Section 3.2 of this paper.
Relationship between PTR and TOC -H 1
Essential characteristics of these variables are as follows: Mean PTR = 1.74, Median PTR = 1.00, Mean TOC = 3.63, Median TOC = 4.00 and SR = 0.40, p-value < 0.05. So, we can conclude that project total costs (TOC) statistically signifi cantly and positively correlate with project transparency (PTR) at the 5% signifi cance level. First, let us focus on the total costs of a given project (TOC). Generally, TOC are expected to at least moderately decrease in the case of internationally shared projects (expectation of 77.7% of responders, just 22.3% of them has expected TOC increase).
Further parts of the survey examined bases for this expectation, i.e. what are the causes of the expectation of an at least moderate decrease in total costs of an internationally shared project?
The survey results have further indicated the expected increase in armaments project transparency (PTR) in the case of its international sharing. In the case of international sharing of an armaments project, 51.1% of the responders have expected a substantial increase in its PTR, 33.3% responders have anticipated a moderate PTR improvement. An unchanged PTR level has been expected by 7.4% of responders. The same number of responders, i.e. 7.4% has anticipated moderate or signifi cant PTR deterioration. It means that the most frequent expectation has accented substantial PTR improvement, which can be viewed -besides assumed economic benefi ts -as one of the noneconomic benefi ts of international sharing of armaments contracts.
Is there any relation between PTR and project total costs (TOC)? As the survey results show, there is a signifi cant difference in the level of expectations (Wilcoxon Z = 3.944993; p-value = 0.000080). This expectation results from international mechanism within given "weapon system club" guaranteeing monitoring of behaviour of not just contractor(s) but also national governments and other agencies involved. So, enhanced PTR can be viewed as one of the important drivers of cost decrease in international armaments projects. The relationship described is illustrated in detail in the Figure 1 below. The anticipation of decreased TOC of an internationally shared armaments project has been confi rmed (moderate decrease represents the most frequent reply; Median TOC = Mode TOC = moderate decrease). 
Relationship between TOC and TRC -H 2
Is there any relationship between the expected TOC decrease and the anticipated development of a given project's overall transaction costs ( TRC)? Basic characteristics of these variables are as follows: Mean TOC = 3.63, Median TOC = 4.00, Mean TRC = 3.11, Median TRC = 3.00 and SR = 0.45, p-value < 0.05. This implies that project total costs (TOC) statistically signifi cantly and positively correlate with project's overall transaction costs (TRC) at the 5% signifi cance level. The Wilcoxon test has confi rmed a signifi cance of the difference between the expected level of TOC and TRC are only at p-value < 0.1 (Z = 1.866633; p-value = 0.061954). It means that generally, there is low signifi cance in the difference in the levels of expectations when comparing TRC and TOC. So, we can conclude that in spite of growing complexity of shared project management, resulting from a higher number of partners pooled within given weapon systems club, transaction costs do not grow as expected and therefore do not hinder the expected decrease in total costs of a given project.
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Relationship between ITC and TOC -H 3
Similarly, when assessing the difference in anticipated levels of the TOC and TRC variables, the Wilcoxon test has been also used to assess the differences in expected levels of pairs of variables representing individual transaction costs (ITC) in relation to project total costs (TOC). Survey results regarding individual components of ITC (ICC, CNC, CMC and CEC) The survey results show that components of ITC are expected to either moderately decrease (ICC, CNC) or remain unchanged (CMC, CEC) in the case of cooperation of several governments compared to the variant when each government carries out a given project independently. So, ITC are expected to have a decreasing tendency with approaching international sharing of a given armaments project, and therefore contribute to the expected decrease in project total costs (TOC).
Relationship between CTC and TOC -H 4
Do collective transaction costs (CTC) behave similarly to TOC? To fi nd an answer to this question, expectations included in the survey in relation to PSC, PNC and PEC variables have been visualized (see the Figure 3 below). In applying analogous methods as in the case of ITC components, the difference in the levels of expectations has been assessed: PSC -TOC (Z = 1.505099; p-value = 0.132300), PNC -TOC (Z = 0.594651; p-value = 0.552077), PEC -TOC (Z = 3.936686; p-value = 0.00008).
These results show that a statistically signifi cant difference at the 5% signifi cance level has been detected only for expectations of the PEC and TOC variables. Based on the three latter dependencies described above, we can conclude that CTC will moderately increase in case of international sharing of a given armaments project.
Do the empirically identifi ed factors correspond with theoretical classifi cation of transaction costs as individual and collective ones ? -H 5 In order to identify individual and collective transaction costs defi ned above in this paper, factor analysis has been applied. Based on the set of the ten determinants, fi ve variables have been selected (costs of negotiation terms and conditions with contractor(s) (CNC), costs of monitoring of contract fulfi lment by the contractor(s) (CMC), costs of possible enforcement of contract fulfi lment by the contractor(s) (CEC), costs of searching for partner(s) (PSC) and costs of negotiating joint project terms and conditions with partner(s) (PNC)), characterizing potential transaction costs, generated both at individual and collective approach to arms procurement. Using the correlation matrix of the selected fi ve variables, a factor loadings matrix has been determined and subsequently rotated by the varimax method. After performing this rotation, results have shown that the fi rst two factors have explained nearly 75 % of the total variability, which regarding conclusions of other authors (Johnson and Wichern, 2007; Odehnal and Michálek, 2009 ) can be viewed as statistically suffi cient. Table  5 shows the rotated factor loadings matrix, which demonstrates that the fi rst factor is saturated by variables CNC, CMC, CEC and explains about 40 % of variability. The second factor is saturated by variables PSC and PNC and explains about 35 % of variability. As already mentioned above, by applying factor analysis of data gathered within the survey, two factors of transaction costs have been identifi ed. Regarding the resulting factor loadings, they have been identifi ed as: Both of the empirically identifi ed factors confi rm theoretical assumptions, described above in this paper.
Do the expectations declared by individual segments of responders answer the key questions similarly? -H 6
The expected dependencies collected and analysed within this survey represent the expectations of three categories of experts, namely of 19 % of defense industry experts, 18 % of contracting authorities' staff and 63 % of experts from universities and research institutes. Consistency of expectations of these three categories of experts has been examined using the Kruskal Wallis Test for multiple comparisons (e.g. KW = 7.386543, k = 3, p-value = 0.0605 for TOC; KW = 2.638248, k = 3, p-value = 0.4508 for TRC; KW = 3.966463, k = 3, p-value = 0.2651 for PTR). In all examined cases, differences among the categories of experts have been shown to be unimportant at the 5% signifi cance level. Therefore, it is possible to state that responders representing all of the three categories have declared identical anticipations, which confi rms the validity of the survey results. Although international community has been addressed dominantly within the survey, approx. 55.6% of the active responders represented the Czech expert community, while the other 44.4% included experts from other NATO and/or EU member countries. So, the results of this survey have been strongly infl uenced by the "Czech point of view". Did the Czech and international responders answer the key questions 1 similarly? In fact, using the Mann-Whitney test this time, there was no signifi cant difference found between the dependencies anticipated by the Czech and international experts (e.g. MW = 0.439155, p-value = 0.66055 for TOC; MW = 0.268373, p-value = 0.78841 for TRC; MW = − 0.756323, p-value = 0.44946 for PTR).
Conclusion
Based on a survey of expectations of international community, a moderate decrease in overall costs borne by individual governments is to be anticipated in case of an internationally shared armaments project. Mutual control among the weapon system club partners can be viewed as one of the greatest benefi ts of international armaments cooperation, resulting in higher project transparency and therefore, lower costs. Transaction costs are expected to remain unchanged after approaching international armaments cooperation. However, their individual component is to decrease, mainly 1
The key questions have related to the variables of total costs (TOC), overall transaction costs (TRC) and project transparency (PTR).
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due to the expected decrease of costs of collecting information on requirements and costs of negotiating terms and conditions of contract with contractor(s). On the other hand, collective component are to increase proportionally. This results mainly from the increase of costs related to negotiating terms and conditions of cooperation with given weapon system club partner(s) and costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance by partner(s). Nevertheless, in the case of repeating cooperation among nations pooled in a given weapons system club for several projects, a moderate decrease in collective transaction costs can be further expected. In relation to transaction costs, two factors have been identifi ed, explaining app. 75 % of the total variability. These two factors correspond with the defi nition of individual and collective transaction costs defi ned in this paper. Validity of the survey results has been verifi ed by proving consistency of replies of individual groups of responders.
